Fingerprinting of web browsers and the consequences for privacy


Fingerprinting of web browsers is a known technique to identify website users. This enables to track users and their habits across websites without the use of cookies. Approximately 93 percent of Web browsers have a unique fingerprint. Particularly meaningful are lists of installed plugins, screen resolution, time zone, language and fonts. In this case a unique hash for the user’s browsers is created. This hash can be used to (re-)identify visitors over different sessions and IP addresses. Sharing this hash and associated personal information with external organizations then allows tracking users over the boundaries of websites and creating a detailed personal profile of interests and habits. The actual problems for the users arise with the consequences for their privacy in connection with fingerprinting.

Types and Vulnerabilities

Fingerprinting is distinguished in two types, the active and passive one. Passive characteristics (IP header, TCP header, HTTP header, User-Agent, supported languages) are sent implicitly to the server every time a browser loads a website. Active characteristics have to be received actively over client-side script languages (e.g. Flash or JavaScript). To recognize clients about her fingerprint it is necessary to have rare characteristics e.g.  Rarely Browser Plugins or barely used fonts. Using browsers (like Chrome, Firefox or Internet Explorer) in combination with a desktop pc it’s almost impossible to be not unique. Especially the personalization of the computer e.g. background colors and rare fonts makes it moreover unique. Due to the mass of characteristics a fingerprint can often clearly be associated with one unique browser. Even if in a longer period of time smaller changes have occurred (new plugins have been added or older were deleted) the fingerprint will be unique.

Fingerprinting as Useful Feature

A browser’s fingerprint can be used as a feature as well. For quite some time software vendors use the possibility to create fingerprints from devices to protect against unlawful dissemination of their software. In this process the software vendors create a fingerprint from the hardware of the device. The safety for the user can also be increased. Website operators can regularly check which user is logged in from which browser, so they can react to the case if one account is used by a different browser which might be the case if an account was hijacked. An online banking site can record fingerprints over the last logins and react on different fingerprints by requiring the user to perform an additional security step (e.g. security question, CAPTCHA). This feature can protect the users against foreign accesses on his user accounts.

Impact on user’s privacy

Which privacy impact is expected for the users? As user tracking is been done, the most asked question is: Does a browser fingerprint count as personal data and is it in need of protection? In fact a fingerprint can be assigned to a particular person in a large number of cases and thus identifies a user. Using efficient algorithms it would be possible to (re-)identify users and thus track them over a long period of time. If this data is stored and evaluated, it would be possible to create a profile for a particular user. Correlating a fingerprint with personal data (e. g. first name, last name, address) by using popular social media sites the fingerprint is no longer anonymous. It would be conceivable that website providers, advertisement distributors and secret services use this method to track users and their habits.

Mitigate browser fingerprinting

There are some mitigation techniques to prevent users from being identified through unique browser fingerprints. However a lot of these techniques have their downsides. The most effective way of mitigating browser fingerprinting is to disable JavaScript. Multiple of features within a browser fingerprint can be made unavailable by turning off JavaScript.  The problem in this mitigation is that a lot of websites require client-side scripting techniques to render content correctly. So although this measure is very effective it is very impractical. So the most practical advice is that a user should not change default settings like fonts, colors and use as very little plugins as possible. Unfortunately this method is not sufficient enough to be not unique and brings only a conditional success.


Summing up it’s to say that even for an experienced user it’s very difficult to not having a unique browser fingerprint. Only with very large efforts and limitations it’s possible to protect effectively from Browser fingerprinting. Especially for a regular user there is no easy mitigation given but usually those users are not bothered enough by this topic to take actions. Possibilities like the Tor-Browser can help but it solves the problem only partially. In a test a browser, a fingerprint of a clean installed Ubuntu Linux without any changes was created. Even in this case, a unique browser fingerprint could be discovered. If you want to test your browser fingerprint, Panopticlick has developed a great tool which is available at (Panopticlick).


Fingerprint of a clean installed Ubuntu Linux (Panopticlick)



Fingerprint of a Tor Browser (Panopticlick)



Fingerprint without JavaScript (Panopticlick)


Author: Franz

Franz is a pentester and interested in IT security topics. He has been working in IT security for three years now and studied business informatics before that.

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